Introduction
Contemporary research and practice in the fields of global environmental change and natural hazards places a strong emphasis on the likely implications of future climatic changes for the exposure to environmental hazards. Researchers in fields such as physical geography and climatology have developed increasingly sophisticated techniques for modelling and predicting future climates (Solomon, et. al., 2007) . At the same time research in human geography and similar social science disciplines continues to contribute to a rapidly growing literatures on the changing vulnerabilities of local communities in the face of both environmental and socio-economic changes (Eakin, Winkels, & Sendzimir, 2009; Frazier, Wood, Yarnal, & Bauer, 2010; Kleinosky, Yarnal & Fisher, 2006; Klinenberg, 2002; Leichenko & O'Brien 2008; Leichenko, O'Brien, & Solecki, 2010; O'Brien, et. al. 2004; Lopez-Marrero & Yarnal, 2011) and to the challenges of adapting to those changes Adger & Barnett, 2009; Moser and Boykoff, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Pelling, 2011) . A particular emphasis has been placed on the contemporary and future challenges faced by cities in both developing and developed world contexts (Chan, Mitchell, Adekola, & McDonald, 2012; Chatterjee, 2010; Mitchell, 1999; Leichenko, 2011; Pelling, 2003; Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011) . While this focus on the contemporary and future hazards facing cities is both admirable and necessary a growing number of researchers have also highlighted that there is much to be learned from historical analyses of both physical exposure and human vulnerability to past hazard events (Bankoff, Lübken, & Sand, 2012; Bankoff, 2013; Bankoff, 2003; Galloway, 2013; Hickey, 2011; Ludlow, et. al. 2013; Mauch & Pfister, 2009; Mitchell, 2011; Pfister, et. al. 1999; Rohr, 2013) .
Focusing on three of Ireland's coastal cities this paper further highlights the importance of a historic analysis of flood hazards in contextualising current events and potential future risks. Contemporary narratives of large flood events experienced in Ireland within the last decade have presented recent floods as new and unprecedented while assuming that floods can and should be prevented through appropriate risk management. In this paper I contend that these narratives rely almost exclusively on one form of knowledge production (quantitative risk assessment) and one form of data (quantitative instrumental records and future modelling projections based on them).
This reliance on one type of knowledge supports a narrow range of policy and decision making responses as quantitative risk management practices are assumed to be the optimal means of reducing loss. While non-structural alternatives to traditional engineering approaches now form part of national flood hazards management policy, they appear to have gained little traction. Assuming that their cities face an unprecedented new challenge encourages officials, decision-makers and local communities to consider new and unprecedented solutions including large scale engineering fixes which may not be environmentally, socially or economically sustainable. It also neglects to consider the lessons that might be learned from an examination of how societies coped with floods in the past. I argue that historical evidence challenges the dominance of a risk management approach and illustrates the value of incorporating a wider range of data sources and types of knowledge into risk and vulnerability assessments. It demonstrates that large floods are a part of the historical experience of Ireland's coastal cities and that a historical analysis of these events may offer important lessons for contemporary policy and decision-making. The limited initial analysis presented in this paper draws primarily on newspaper archives but in doing so it highlights the need for further historical research based on additional archival and unwritten sources. This historic approach places the human experience of hazards at the centre of the analysis in contrast to impacts based approaches which have been accused of echoing environmental determinism and Darwinist principles (Ribot, 2011) . A historic perspective can also illustrate the extent to which understandings of hazards shift over time allowing hazards to be framed in contrasting and sometimes contradictory ways with important implications for the types of decisions we make about them (Mitchell, 2006) .
Ireland's Coastal Cities
This research focuses on three of Ireland's largest coastal cities, Cork, Dublin and Galway. Dublin is the capital of the Republic of Ireland and the largest city on the island. With a population of over 1.5 million people the Greater Dublin Area is home to almost 40% of the population of the Republic of Ireland and is the centre of economic and political activity in the country. Throughout the city's history, its proximity to water has been essential to its development and growth (Gilligan, 1988) . However the story of Dublin's development is not just about its proximity to water, it is a story of humanenvironment interactions including numerous attempts to manage and tame the waters that surround the city. The construction of quay walls, modification of river channels, and land reclamations have been a feature of the city's development for centuries (Moore, 2008) . Dublin is situated on a low lying coastal plain at the confluence of three major rivers, the Liffey, Tolka and Dodder. The city is also traversed by numerous smaller streams and rivers, most of which have been culverted for some or all of their length. The larger rivers have also been modified. In the case of the Tolka this has been in the form of small weirs and flood defences which channelise the river. Three dams were built on the Liffey between 1937 and 1949. These were designed primarily for the production of hydroelectricity but have also been used to provide a reservoir for water supply and to regulate the discharge of flood waters (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001) . Two earthen dams on the Dodder create water supply reservoirs for Dublin City Council.
Concerns regarding the possible overtopping and failure of these dams during periods of heavy rainfall led to the construction of new spillways completed in 2006 (Dublin City Council, 2008a) .
With a population of 119,000 within the city boundary, Cork is the second largest city in the Republic of Ireland. Due to its physical characteristics the city has a long history of flooding. Much of the city centre is built on what is now an island between two channels of the River Lee, both of which are tidal. The city was originally constructed on a series of islands in what was then a large swamp. Over several centuries neighbouring islands were included and the channels in between were filled or culverted over. Much of the modern city centre island lies at elevations that are just above the level of the highest spring tides and is exposed to flooding of both river and tidal origin.
Two upstream dams on the River Lee were completed during the 1950s and were built primarily for the production of hydroelectricity. While they have been operated to successfully control small floods in the past (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001) , there have also been several occasions when large floods have exceeded the capacity of the dams to regulate them (Jeffers, 2011a) .
Galway is a city of 72,000 located on the northern shore of Galway Bay, at the mouth of the River Corrib. Due to its location on Ireland's exposed west coast, Galway faces the greatest exposure to storms of the three research sites. River flooding has rarely been an issue in the city in modern times as the river is controlled by a weirs and canals. The city's exposure to coastal flooding has increased throughout its history as the city expanded westwards along the coastline eventually including the once separate village of Salthill. Parts of the city's docklands and other coastal districts are constructed on lands that were reclaimed from the sea. Further reclamations are likely as part of a plan to develop a new port in deeper water. 1920s (Barry & Partners, 2002; Dublin City Council, 2002; O'Connell and Coe, 2003; Royal Haskoning, 2005) . A tidal surge produced by a combination of gale force winds and low atmospheric pressure, coincided with an already high spring tide to produce sea levels over one metre higher than had originally been predicted (Dublin City Council, 2002; Royal Haskoning, 2005 the River Dodder on the city's south side and along the banks of the Royal Canal on the north side were inundated by floodwaters ranging in depth from just a few centimetres to over one and a half metres (Barry & Partners, 2002; Dublin City Council, 2002; O'Connell and Coe, 2003; Royal Haskoning, 2005) . Fortunately this flood did not result in any fatalities but economic losses were substantial. Almost eight hundred houses were flooded with many of these requiring expensive repairs and renovations (Dublin City Council, 2002) . It is estimated that as many as forty percent of these homes may not have had insurance coverage 1 (Dublin City Council, 2002) .
The reaction to this flood and its aftermath among local officials and the general public was one of shock. In interviews completed in 2009 as part of the larger project of which this paper forms a part, local officials, residents and other stakeholders frequently spoke of their shock and distress at the extent of the 2002 flood, the fact that it was not predicted, its rapid onset, and its impacts on local communities (Jeffers, 2011b) . This flood and subsequent river flooding in November of the same year prompted reviews of policy and practice at both local and national levels. there are doubts about the success of this change (Jeffers, 2013a (Jeffers, , 2011a ) and challenges to its implementation remain (Scott, el. al., 2013) .
The second contemporary narrative of flood hazards suggests that flood events can be prevented through appropriate engineering interventions and that flood prevention is the optimal means of reducing flood losses. The influence of this narrative was most clearly manifested in the aftermath of river flooding experienced in Cork City in November 1 Property insurance coverage in Ireland generally includes flood insurance.
2009. Although flooding is not unusual in Cork, the November 2009 flood was described by local officials and residents as the worst river flood to strike the city for many years (Jeffers, 2011a) . It resulted from the release of large volumes of water from the Inniscarra Dam in the aftermath of heavy rainfall. The operators of the dam, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB, now known as Electric Ireland) claimed that the release was necessary to preserve the structural integrity of the dam during what they described as a one in eight hundred year event (Hickey, 2010) . As a result of this discharge much of the city centre island and the city's western suburbs experienced heavy flooding. The impacts included widespread disruption to drinking water supplies due to damage to the city's water treatment plant. In the aftermath of the event public discourse was dominated by a narrative that suggested that the flood should have been preventable (or at the very least more accurately forecast) and that some agencies or organisations must be to blame for these failures. This narrative was clearly visible in the testimony of numerous witnesses before a parliamentary investigation into the event and its aftermath (Joint Committee on the Environment, Heritage & Local Government, 2010) . The narrative of flood prevention and its influence on flood hazards policy was also clear in interviews with local officials and decision-makers across all three cities. Flood prevention through structural interventions was often seen as essential to economic prosperity due to the risk that flood events might be viewed negatively by potential investors (Jeffers, 2013b) . Despite an official shift in policy that encourages a move away from reactive structural interventions in response to major flood events, prevention through an engineering fix remains the preferred means of managing flood risk (Jeffers, 2013a) .
Historical Evidence for Large Floods
The research on which this paper is based formed part of a larger project which investigated vulnerability to flood hazards and climate change adaptation in Ireland's coastal cities (Jeffers, 2013a (Jeffers, , 2013b (Jeffers, , 2011a (Jeffers, , 2011b . This wider project drew on a range of data collection methods including semi-structured interviews with local decisionmakers and an analysis of records of decision-making such as the minutes of City It is recognised as inevitable that the record produced does not include every flood experienced in each city as some events may not have been reported, may not be included in the www.floodmaps.ie database or may not have been returned by the search function of The Irish Times database. There is also a wealth of other potential archival sources that could be used to add further detail to the record produced here (Mitchell, 2011) Despite its limitations the historical reconstruction produced here provides a new record of major floods. As I discuss in detail throughout the remainder of the paper, this analysis allows for an important critique of contemporary policy and practice, while also pointing to the pressing need for further historical analysis of urban flood hazards, not just in Ireland but also in flood prone cities in other countries where extensive archives and other source materials may be available but remain largely untapped. The listing of flood events generated for each city is included in Appendices 1, 2 and 3.
Floods in Dublin
River floods have been a frequent hazard throughout the history of the Dublin while coastal and pluvial flooding have also occurred periodically. Historical records dating from as early as the year 693 describe severe river flooding in eastern regions of Ireland but the first record specific to Dublin is of an event in 1385 when a bridge is believed to have collapsed during a flood (Dixon, 1953) . Flooding from the Rivers Liffey, Poddle and Dodder appear to have been most common during the 1700s and 1800s with numerous reports of bridges being damaged or destroyed as well as the flooding of homes and businesses (Cawley, et. al., 2005; Dixon, 1953) . While some of these bridge collapses are undoubtedly related to the nature of the bridges themselves which would have been neither as large nor as strong as their modern replacements, the city seems to have experienced some very large floods during its history. Despite the frequency and extent of flooding loss of life in flood events has generally been low. For example a flood on the Liffey, Dodder and Poddle in 1802 was described as one of the worst in the history of the city but only one death was recorded (Cawley, et. al., 2005; Dixon, 1953) .
In contrast to the low death toll reported in this event a flood on the Liffey in 1807 resulted in at least nineteen deaths (Dixon, 1953) rainfall records. Flood waters were over 2.5m deep in some locations, affecting over 400 properties (Cawley, et. al., 2005; Met Éireann, 1986) . In 1789 a river flood described as being between 1.5m to 2.1m deep killed at least one resident (Hickey, 2010; Cawley, et. al., 2005) . In November 1853 another river flood produced water levels that are believed to have been between 2m and 3m deep and led to the deaths of 12 people (Hickey, 2010) . Flooding continued to be a common feature of the life of the city throughout the Twentieth Century with further flooding in 1916 described by Cawley, et. al. (2005) as comparable to the 1853 event. However The Irish Times reported flood waters over 1.8m deep in areas to the west of the city centre and up to 1.5m closer the city centre, shallower depths than reported in 1853.
The history of flooding in the city suggests that the largest flood depths and most significant socio-economic impacts were usually associated with river floods although tidal surges frequently left the city centre flooded to depths of up to 1 m. It is worth nothing that for some of these tidal flood events such as that experienced in February 1967, the residents and business owners of the city appear to have been well prepared.
The Irish Times records that few losses were experienced as business owners had moved stock off ground floors. The Irish Times of May 3 rd 1962 also reports that the city began tests on a flood warning system. It is not clear how the warnings were to be produced but they were to be disseminated to the population of the city by means of a loud speaker mounted on a van. These reports of a well prepared city contrast sharply with more recent events which appear to have struck a largely unprepared population. It is 
Floods in Galway
Despite its location on the banks of the Corrib my analysis did not find any reports of river flooding in Galway's recent history. This sits in contrast to coastal flooding which has occurred frequently. Reports on the 'Night of the Big Wind' in January 1839, reputed to be among the worst storms ever experienced in Ireland (Shields & Fitzgerald, 1989) , describe Salthill has having been impacted by the storm but it is not clear if the damage was caused by the wind itself, coastal flooding or some combination of the two (Carr, 1993) . The earliest flood reported by The Irish Times was in 1887 when the sea is described as having come up onto the land in the city. Under current policy and practice primacy is given to numeric quantifiable data in allowed flood risk assessments leading to the assumption that Ireland is "data poor" (Scott, et. al. 2013, p.137) . However Ireland is only data poor when the types of data included in risk assessments is limited to numeric instrumental records. If a wider range of possible data sources is considered then Ireland is in fact data rich. A wide range of historical sources provides the potential to create long term historic databases for floods and other hazards drawing on sources ranging from newspaper archives to diaries and letters (Mitchell, 2011) . Tyrrell and Hickey's (1991) examination of flooding in Cork based on local newspaper archives illustrates how a much more detailed record than the one provided in this paper might be constructed through more extensive archival research than was possible for this paper.
The narrow focus on quantitative risk assessment is understandable given the institutional structures within which flood hazards are managed. These place responsibility in the hands of a limited range of experts (usually engineers) who deploy the range of skills available to them to address the challenges they face (Jeffers, 2013a) .
They also operate within an institutional structure which assumes that floods can be prevented and managed through engineering fixes (Jeffers, 2013a) . Some attempts have been made to implement a paradigm shift away from a reactive flood prevention based approach to a more proactive flood risk management approach that emphasises the importance of land use planning and regulating new development in flood prone locations (Scott et. al., 2013 , Jeffers, 2013a . While this is a welcome step it is limited by the narrow focus on quantifiable data, and the validity of the outputs of quantitative risk assessments are often questioned by local stakeholders and elected representations (Scott, et. al., 2013) . The historical analysis demonstrates that more effective risk and vulnerability assessments could be conducted by including a wider range of data sources and expertise. My aim here is not to critique the important work of engineers but to suggest that their work could be supported by historians, geographers and other researchers from across the social sciences and the humanities. This could lead to a broader understanding of hazards and a wider range of policy options for addressing them.
The integration of such a broader coalition of research expertise and data sources into the decision-making process is of course limited by a range of challenges and barriers.
These include the ways in which a quantitative risk management approach that focuses almost exclusively on physical exposure to the exclusion of socio-economic vulnerability is structurally and discursively embedded in the decision-making process (Jeffers, 2013a) . The inclusion of a wider range of data can only occur with the acceptance of engineers who are likely to remain the key experts in decision-making positions in local authorities and other agencies charged with flood hazards management. Such acceptance might be enhanced through the training of engineers and other officials specialising in flood risk management or through specific policy requirements that require the inclusion of social and historical data.
Any broader coalition of expertise and data sources would need to recognise the strengths and limitations inherent in all data sources, and that different types of data will serve different purposes within an overall assessment of risk and vulnerability. There are obvious limitations to the use of non numeric historic data as it cannot be easily integrated into quantitative models of risk. However it can clearly illustrate that large floods have occurred in the past and if sufficient data is available it can be used to construct more accurate estimates of return periods (de Kraker, 2013) . This data should not be ignored as it illustrates the limitations of quantitative risk assessment. It demonstrates that risk assessments based on relatively short instrumental records may not be able to deliver what they promise, that is they may not be able to accurately predict return periods. The more qualitative data available from other sources can be used to help address these limitations by potentially extending the database of known flood events by hundreds of years or more. While details such as the depth and extent of any individual flood may not be easily quantifiable with the degree of accuracy provided by the instrumental record, the overall picture of flood risk that could be created would be a more complete one that could better support sustainable hazards management.
Challenging Narratives of Prevention
While the data provided by a historical analysis suffers from the limitations discussed above, one of its greatest strengths lies in its ability to provide insights that the quantitative instrumental record cannot, that is, insights into the human and social dimensions of flood hazards over time. Such data can provide information on the ways in which floods have been framed and understood and the ways in which they have been experienced and responded to. These insights can directly challenge the second narrative that has often dominated reactions to recent flood events. This second narrative has focused on the idea that floods can and should be prevented and that such prevention provides the optimal means of reducing flood losses. This narrative is closely linked to the narrative of surprise and shock discussed above. As a narrow range of knowledge is used in the study of flood risk, floods continue to be viewed as external events impacting on an often largely passive human society (Jeffers, 2013a) . This view persists despite an official attempt to shift national flood policy to less structural approaches (Scott, et. al.,2013; Jeffers, 2013a) . A conceptualisation of floods as external events impacting a passive human population is perpetuated through devices such as the source-pathway-receptor model of flood risk which features prominently in the new planning based policies (Jeffers, 2013a) . Little or no consideration is given to what have been described as "the societal issues associated with flood risk" (Scott et. al., 2013, p.135) . This narrow understanding of flood hazards encourages a narrow range of potential responses to flood hazards, those that claim to be able to eliminate flood events themselves through engineering fixes, an approach that has been extensively critiqued by geographers and other social scientists (Changnon, 2005; Ludy & Kondolf, 2012; López-Marrero & Yarnal, 2010; Penning-Rowsell, 2000; Penning-Rowsell, Winchester, & Gardiner, 1998; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004; Wong & Zhao, 2001) . that were both well aware of and well adjusted to ongoing flood hazards (Rohr, 2013) .
They have also emphasised the need to view flood hazards as complex interactions between socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental processes in order to fully understand their impacts (Bankoff, 2013; Galloway, 2013) .
These reports of greater preparedness in earlier decades of the twentieth century may also suggest that the contemporary narrative of flood prevention is part of a shift in the expectations of local populations regarding the rights and responsibilities of the State in the field of flood hazards management. It may be the case that local populations assumed a greater degree of personal responsibility in the past but that there is now an increased expectation that the burden of flood hazards preparedness, management, and loss should be borne by the State or by other stakeholders such as insurance companies.
Possible shifts in the social contract between citizens, the State and other actors have been the focus of recent research which suggests a significant level of reliance on the State among populations experiencing flooding in Ireland (Adger, Quinn, Lorenzoni, Murphy, & Sweeney, 2012) . Encouraging individual home and business owners to take an increased responsibility for flood preparedness as they seem to have done in the past could constitute one means of improving preparedness and reducing vulnerability. This is not an argument for allowing the State to divest itself of responsibility but for a discussion on the rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders, and the most appropriate scale at which to address flood hazards. Longer term historical studies in other parts of Europe have revealed that a variety of institutional structures and cultural practices had emerged in response to ongoing flood hazards. In medieval England a system of marsh law enshrined the principle that those who benefited from flood defences ought to contribute to their maintenance (Galloway, 2013) , while in fourteenth and fifteenth century Austria, municipal regulations and charters helped to create a culture of flood management (Rohr, 2013 ).
An attempt to institute a change in the roles and responsibilities and actors by shifting However the attempt to shift the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders without a full debate on the social contract is also likely to be a key reason for its ineffectiveness. The initial historic analysis presented in this paper clearly illustrates that society may have been more prepared and consequently less vulnerable in the past. The reasons why this is was the case and how it might be replicated today could be illuminated by a more indepth historical analysis. Effectively managing future flood risks and vulnerabilities will require a wider range of innovative and creative approaches than is currently employed.
It will also require a shift from assuming that flooding will not happen to learning to live with flood risk (Bankoff, 2013; Lewis and Kelman, 2009) . A historical perspective that looks to both the recent and more distant past for inspiration has much to offer in helping to develop alternative strategies.
The historical analysis presented here also challenges the narrative of flood prevention by illustrating that floods are just one aspect of the relationship between urban and the waters they live beside. It also illustrates that cities themselves are dynamic entities whose growth and change is constantly reshaping vulnerability and exposure. Changes in the size, extent, architecture and built environment of any city combine with shifting socio-economic conditions to create a complex mix of vulnerabilities (Bankoff, 2003) .
As mentioned earlier changes such as modification of river channels and the construction of dams often reduced flood risk. However these may also have increased longer term vulnerability by creating a false sense of security, while urban expansion increased exposure through development on flood plains and runoff from paved surfaces (Jeffers, 2013b) . These changes have led to the re-emergence of past hazards (Jeffers, 2013b; Mitchell, 2003) . Docklands regeneration projects across all three cities are also likely to increase the number of people living and working in exposed locations (Jeffers, 2013b) .
Cities develop in the locations they occupy for reasons that are closely associated with their proximity to water. Dublin, Cork and Galway mirror many cities around the world in developing in their current locations for defensive and trading purposes. While the defensive importance of the sites has long passed, the economic importance of the port functions remains although these have moved further from the city centre over time.
The historic development of each city illustrates that proximity to water is both a resource and a hazard, and that living in these cities involves some balance between these elements. This balance was illustrated during a dispute that emerged between local residents and Dublin City Council officials over plans for new flood defences in the Clontarf area of the city. In 2011 local residents and businesses vigorously opposed plans to erect large flood defences along the sea front citing negative impacts on their views of the sea and limitations on access to the shoreline. While it could be suggested that some residents were seeking to have their cake and eat it, in arguing for both flood defences and the preservation of recreational use, it could also be argued that their campaign for smaller flood defences was a recognition of the need for balance between the resources and the hazards of living in a coastal location. A historic analysis illustrates how this balance has been recognised in the past and therefore further challenges the narrative that flood prevention is the optimal means of reducing loss.
This is not to suggest that engineering solutions will not play some part in effectively addressing flood hazards as in some cases they clearly will. However in order to determine the most appropriate means of addressing flood hazards, a wider discussion that recognises a broader understanding of human-environment interaction is necessary.
It may be more beneficial to focus on flood loss which geographers have long declared to be a social phenomenon (White 1945,) rather than floods themselves which are often viewed as natural events with social consequences. A historic analysis helps to illuminate this social character of flood losses.
Conclusions
This paper has employed a limited historic analysis of flood events in three of Ireland's coastal cities to challenge contemporary narratives of flood risk and the decisionmaking and policy responses that have emerged from them. In doing so it demonstrates the value of such a historic perspective, not just for understanding hazards in Irish cities but for similar cities in other counties. In critiquing these narratives and current flood hazards policy my aim has been not simply to wield what Paul Robbins would describe as the hatchet of critique (Robbins, 2004) , but to attempt to sow the seeds of a creative and innovative alternative. There are clear deficiencies in current policy and practice in Ireland, despite well intentioned attempts to implement a paradigm shift in flood hazards management. Similar deficiencies are evident in wider approaches to climate change adaptation in many countries which has focused on quantifying physical exposure and attempting to model future risk with the social dimensions of climate hazards often limited to an impacts based approach (Ribot, 2011; Bassett and Fogelman, 2013) . This paper proposes that a more extensive historical analysis of both physical exposure and socio-economic vulnerability that draws on the expertise of a range of researchers including geographers and historians can provide a broader understanding of current and future hazards. This in turn can open the possibilities for a genuine paradigm shift in policy and practice, leading to more effective vulnerability reduction strategies that recognise environmental hazards as a complex social phenomenon, and decreasing the reliance on costly and environmentally harmful engineering solutions.
